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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effectiveness of the ‘quantitative easing’ policy, as implemented 
by the Bank of England in March 2009. Similar policies had been previously implemented in 
Japan, the U.S. and the Eurozone. The effectiveness is measured by the impact of Bank of 
England policies (including, but not limited to QE) on nominal GDP growth – the declared 
goal of the policy, according to the Bank of England. Unlike the majority of the literature on 
the topic, the general-to-specific econometric modeling methodology (a.k.a. the ‘Hendry’ or 
‘LSE’ methodology) is employed for this purpose. The empirical analysis indicates that QE as 
defined and announced in March 2009 had no apparent effect on the UK economy. 
Meanwhile, it is found that a policy of ‘quantitative easing’ defined in the original sense of 
the term (Werner, 1994) is supported by empirical evidence: a stable relationship between a 
lending aggregate (disaggregated M4 lending, i.e. bank credit for GDP transactions) and 
nominal GDP is found. The findings imply that BoE policy should more directly target the 
growth of bank credit for GDP-transactions. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Central bank watching has for many years, if not decades, come to focus on 
interest rate policies and how actions of central banks might affect interest 
rates.
1 The preoccupation with interest rates has been so deeply ingrained 
that even quantitative monetary policies often get analysed in terms of their 
impact on interest rates. The first central bank to switch back towards a 
regime of monetary targeting was the Bank of Japan, which in 2001 
announced a change in monetary policy, towards what it later referred to as 
‘quantitative easing’ (QE). This policy has been analysed by economists, 
but the majority of empirical research on its effectiveness has focused on the 
impact it has had on interest rates (including the term structure of interest 
rates). 
 
As Voutsinas and Werner (2010) pointed out, this created two problems. 
Firstly, it left researchers and policy-makers with little information about the 
effectiveness of such (or similar) policies on the macroeconomic variables 
that matter most to governments, central banks and the public at large, 
namely nominal GDP growth. Secondly, it did not contribute towards 
making the central bank more accountable for its policies, as accountability 
requires an assessment of how policy actions affect ultimate targets, not 
intermediate ones. as rendered central bank policy largely unaccountable, 
since accountability includes being accountable for the choice of tools and 
intermediate targets, in achieving a desired ultimate goal (usually nominal 
GDP).  
 
Voutsinas and Werner (2010) suggested therefore to examine the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in a nested general model of the ultimate 
goal (nominal GDP growth). They employ the general-to-specific 
                                                  
1  This despite the fact that there is relatively little empirical research that supports a consistent 
correlation or a particular direction of causation between interest rates and economic growth. Min 
Zhu (2011), for instance, has carefully studied the relationship between nominal interest rates and 
nominal GDP growth in four major economies (US, UK, Germany and Japan) and found the evidence 
not supportive of standard theoretical suppositions. Learning the lessons from QE 
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econometric modeling methodology (a.k.a. the ‘Hendry’ or ‘LSE’ method, 
following Hendry and Mizon, 1978), with the final target as the dependent 
variable, regressed on a large number of explanatory variables, potential and 
actual tools and intermediate targets that were or could have been deployed 
by the central bank. With this approach, the effectiveness of actual and 
potential tools or intermediate targets can be empirically evaluated, 
including the significance of announced policy changes.  
 
The other innovation of their paper was the use of disaggregated credit as 
one of the explanatory variables, on the basis that credit for GDP 
transactions is more likely to be in a stable relationship with nominal GDP. 
This approach solves the problem of the ‘velocity decline’ that confounded 
earlier monetarist attempts at identifying stable empirical models of nominal 
GDP (see Werner, 1992, 1997). 
 
As Voutsinas and Werner (2010) focused on the Japanese case, in this paper 
the same methodology is employed to assess the effectiveness of 
‘quantitative easing’ in the UK. Their methodology appears especially 
relevant to the UK, because the Bank of England has stated explicitly that 
the ultimate target has been nominal GDP growth. In the words of Bank of 
England staff, the policy of quantitative easing was adopted  
 
“with the aim of … increasing nominal spending growth”.
2  
 
“…the effectiveness of the MPC’s asset purchases [QE] will 
ultimately be judged by their impact on the wider macroeconomy.  
 
Further, so far less empirical work has been conducted on the UK case, and 
none adopting this methodology. According to Bank of England staff 
 
“Our analysis suggests that the purchases have had a significant 
impact on financial markets and particularly gilt yields, but there is 
                                                  
2 Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens and Tong (2010), The financial market impact of quantitative easing, Bank 
of England working paper no. 393. Learning the lessons from QE 
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clearly more to learn about the transmission of those effects to the 
wider economy.”  
It is the goal of this paper to contribute towards a better understanding of the 
transmission of monetary policy and the effect of particular tools and 
intermediate targets (actual and potential) “on the wider economy”, as 
measured by nominal GDP. 
 
The empirical analysis indicates that QE as defined and announced in March 
2009 had no apparent effect on the UK economy. Meanwhile, it is found 
that a policy of ‘quantitative easing’ defined in the original sense of the term 
(Werner, 1994) is supported by empirical evidence: a stable relationship 
between a lending aggregate (disaggregated M4 lending, i.e. bank credit for 
GDP transactions) and nominal GDP is found. The findings imply that BoE 
policy should more directly target the growth of bank credit for GDP-
transactions.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the historical origin of the 
term ‘quantitative easing’ is briefly discussed, followed by a brief overview 
of recent international experience with QE. Section 4 surveys the literature 
on the effectiveness of QE (with the majority focusing on the Japanese 
policy). Section 5 implements a new test of the effectiveness of QE in the 
UK. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  Historical Origin of the Term ‘Quantitative Easing’ 
 
Today, QE is often used synonymously with an expansion in the quantity of 
narrow money, figuratively referred to as ‘printing money’ by many 
commentators. The original Japanese expression for “quantitative easing” 
(量的金融緩和,  ryōteki kin'yū kanwa) was used for the first time by a 
central bank in the Bank of Japan’s publications. Indeed, in the Bank of 
Japan’s announcement of 19 March 2001 – universally cited by 
commentators as the first time a policy called QE was implemented by a 
central bank – it is said that a high target of bank reserves held with the 
central bank would be set, which would (at least partly) be achieved by Learning the lessons from QE 
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purchasing more government bonds. Such a policy is identical traditional 
monetarist targeting of narrow money and can thus variously be called an 
expansion in bank reserves, high powered money, monetary base, base 
money, M0 or narrow money.  
 
Since already at least half a dozen well-known expressions existed to 
describe the Bank of Japan’s policy of March 2001 and following years, 
how did it happen that a new expression – yet another synonymous 
definition, namely ‘quantitative easing’ – came to be utilized by 
commentators and central banks? 
 
Curiously, an analysis of the policy announcement actually made by the 
Bank of Japan on 19 March 2001 (Bank of Japan, 2001) shows that neither 
in the Japanese original statement or nor its English translation any use of 
the expression QE or any similar variant is made. It is only in a speech 
given on 9 December 2002 that the BoJ governor reckoned for the first time 
that the central bank was implementing QE. During the year 2001, only 11 
speeches out of 29 given by the BoJ board members mention the term 
‘quantitative easing’, and none of them claims that the policy was 
implemented at the Bank of Japan (in March 2001 or at any other date).   
 
A turning point seems to have occurred when Governor Fukui (appointed in 
February 2003) stated in June 2003 that “The current framework [the BoJ 
is] adopting is called quantitative easing and was introduced on March 19, 
2001”. In his speech, Mr Fukui uses the expression QE 26 times, hitherto 
the highest use on record by a senior central banker. It is therefore not 
earlier than two years after its alleged start that QE was officially recognized 
as an important monetary policy concept.   
 
To be sure, the Japanese central banks used the expression ‘quantitative 
easing’ often in its earlier publication – only and consistently in order to 
make the case that a policy by that name would not work and hence should 
not be introduced. Curiously, the Bank of Japan even argued right until one 
month before the alleged date of introduction of QE, namely until February 
2001, that such a policy of “quantitative easing… is not effective” (Bank of 
Japan, 2001a). It produced such research, because critics of the Japanese Learning the lessons from QE 
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central bank had been using it, in order to argue that the central bank should 
abandon its emphasis on interest rates, and instead adopt a policy they called 
‘QE’.  
 
The first time the expression QE was used prominently was in 1994, by the 
then economist of Jardine Fleming Securities (Asia) Ltd. in his client 
presentations and speeches in Tokyo. He used a macroeconomic model not 
reliant on frictionless markets and general equilibrium but assuming 
rationing and credit constraints, and incorporating a credit-creating banking 
sector. In his previous publications (Werner, 1991, 1992, 1994), Werner had 
already warned of the likely collapse of the Japanese banking system and a 
major economic slowdown. In the following years, Werner made 
recommendations about how the Japanese economy could be stimulated and 
the recession ended (e.g. Werner, 1995). Based on this model (published in 
Werner, 1997) Werner (1995) argued that neither price tools (interest rate 
reductions, even though they were still above 4% at the time), nor 
traditional bank reserves or money supply expansion would create an 
economic recovery.  
 
Instead, the model indicated that the central bank should directly target and 
increase the quantity of credit creation by the overall banking system. Since 
however the Japanese-language translation of ‘credit creation’ can appear to 
be a somewhat obscure expression in modern-day Japan, Werner coined a 
new expression, ‘quantitative easing’, that would describe stimulatory 
monetary policy, but be differentiated from both interest rate policy and 
traditional monetary targeting as recommended by monetarist economists 
(see Werner, 1995).  
 
During his Nov. 19, 2010 speech at the ECB, the Federal Reserve’s 
governor Ben Bernanke stated that “quantitative easing typically refers to 
policies that seek to have effects by changing the quantity of bank reserves, 
a channel which seems relatively weak, at least in the U.S. context”.
3 Why 
                                                  
3 Ben Bernanke (2010), Rebalancing the Global Recovery, speech at the 6th ECB 
Central Banking Conference, Frankfurt, available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20101119a.htm   Learning the lessons from QE 
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the Bank of Japan much later chose to use this expression to refer to its 
traditional monetarist reserve or base money expansion (for which already a 
plethora of epithets existed) remains puzzling. The principle of revealed 
preference suggests that the Bank of Japan thought it worthwhile to 
introduce a new name to describe an old policy, which could not possibly be 
due to the substance of the policy, but instead must be due to its PR value. 
This therefore further highlights the need for a careful examination of the 
empirical evidence that a new policy was indeed introduced. 
 
3  Overview of Recent Japanese and UK Experience with QE 
 
The Japanese case 
Japan’s economy experienced significant asset price rises in the 1980s, 
followed by a major and protracted banking and financial crisis. The Bank 
of Japan responded to the weakening economy by reducing interest rates 
from about 8% in 1991 to 0.001% a decade later (the BoJ has maintained 
short-term interest rates at close to zero since 1999), and by expanding bank 
reserves (commercial banks were provided with excess liquidity to promote 
private lending and reduce the risk of a liquidity shortage).  
 
Ugai (2006) summarises the policy announced in March 2001 (and later 
referred to as QE) as consisting of three components: (i) shifting the BOJ’s 
main operating target from the uncollateralized overnight call rate to the 
current account balances at the Bank (CABs), and supplying ample liquidity 
in an amount substantially in excess of the required reserves; (ii) being 
committed to maintain the policy until the CPI registers stably zero percent 
or an increase year-on-year; and (iii) increasing the purchase of long-term 
Japanese Government Bonds if deemed necessary to facilitate meeting the 
targeted CABs. Under the QE policy, the uncollateralized overnight call rate, 
formerly the main operating target, declined to zero percent.  
 
Over 4 year period starting in March 2001,  the commercial banks’ current 
account balance did indeed increase from ¥5 trillion yen to ¥35 trillion 
(approximately US$300 billion). As well, the BoJ tripled the quantity of 
long-term Japan government bonds it could purchase on a monthly basis.  
 Learning the lessons from QE 
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In spite of these measures, Japan’s central bank has been obviously 
unsuccessful in achieving price stability or stable economic growth: Japan 
holds the world record for deflation in the era of regular GDP statistics and 
Japan’s post-crisis economic underperformance has lasted for the better part 
of two decades.  
 
The UK case 
As part of its response to the global banking crisis and a sharp downturn in 
domestic economic prospects, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) cut Bank Rate from 5% at the start of October 2008 to 
0.5% on 5 March 2009. But given the likelihood of undershooting the 2% 
CPI inflation target in the medium term, the Committee also decided it 
needed to ease monetary conditions further through a programme of asset 
purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves (BoE, 2010). 
This programme was termed ‘quantitative easing’, in reference to Bank of 
Japan’s policies earlier in the decade, referred to by this name. 
 
Although quantitative easing is said by the BoE to have been firstly 
implemented in March 2009, some measures had been undertaken before 
that time. First, the Special Liquidity Scheme was introduced in April 2008. 
From that point onwards, banks and building societies were allowed to swap 
some of their illiquid assets (notably ABS) for liquid UK Treasury bills for a 
period of up to three years. As these trades are stock lending transactions 
they are off balance sheet. The drawdown period for the scheme closed on 
30 January 2009. Furthermore, in January 2009, under a remit from the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Bank established a subsidiary company, 
the Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund (BEAPPF). Its initial 
objective was to improve the liquidity of the corporate credit market by 
making purchases of high-quality private sector assets.  
 
In March 2009, the remit from the Chancellor of the Exchequer was 
extended to allow the MPC to use the Asset Purchase Facility to make 
purchases of assets (now including gilt-edged securities) in pursuit of its 
monetary policy aims. The MPC decided at its regular March 2009 meeting  
that the Bank would buy £75 billion of assets financed through the creation 
of central bank reserves, via the Asset Purchase Facility. Subsequently, the Learning the lessons from QE 
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Committee decided at its meeting in May 2009 to make a further £50 billion 
of asset purchases that would bring total purchases to £125 billion. Again, at 
its meeting in August, the MPC decided to finance a further £50 billion of 
asset purchases so that total purchases would rise to £175 billion. And at its 
meeting in November, the MPC voted to increase total asset purchases to 
£200 billion (£25 billion purchases more). The total amount of such asset 
purchases represents 14% of UK nominal GDP. Most of the assets 
purchased have been UK government securities (gilts), but high-quality 
private sector assets were also purchased. At its meeting in February 2010, 
the Committee voted to maintain the stock of asset purchases at £200 billion 
but the Committee will continue to monitor the appropriate scale of the asset 
purchase programme and reserves the right to further implement asset 
purchases depending on the economic outlook. Given UK’s economic 
prospects the option of further purchasing assets is still contemplated (e.g. 
by MPC member Adam Posen, who called in December 2010 for a £50 
billion expansion of the Bank's quantitative easing programme, whilst his 
colleague Andrew Sentance has called for an increase in interest rates). 
 
Additionally to the asset purchase programme, the Bank of England 
increased the average maturity of its outstanding operations. The range of 
collateral eligible for its longer-term repo operations was widened. This is, 
in contrast to the policy of QE, sometimes referred to as ‘qualitative easing’. 
 
Apart from the asset swap scheme, most of the measures taken by the Bank 
of England as a response to the financial crisis were instruments or 
procedures that already existed in the operational framework of the Bank 
(Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin, 2010). This suggests the possibilitythat the 
expression QE was chosen, just like in the Japanese case, for its potential 
euphemistic PR effect. The following tautological explanation from the 
Bank of England website would indicate a reluctance to clearly assert that 
its QE policy of asset purchases amounted to new money creation:  “the 
sharp increase in reserves balances since March 2009 reflects the fact that 
asset purchases under the MPC's policy of Quantitative Easing have been 
financed by increasing reserves balances”.
4  
                                                  
4 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb/notesiadb/Central_bank_bs.htm Learning the lessons from QE 
- 9 - 
 
 
The scale of the Bank of England’s QE policy, when measured in terms of 
balance sheet expansion, can be seen from Figure 1. It is similar to the Fed’s 
and ECB’s balance sheet expansion (although neither central bank formally 
announced the introduction of a policy called ‘QE’), and significantly 
exceeds the Bank of Japan’s. Given that some defenders of Bank of Japan 
policies have argued that the Japanese QE was merely not large enough, it is 
also interesting to examine how the much larger UK version has fared. 
 
Figure 1: Central banks balance sheets relative to GDP 
 
Notes: The data shown refer to end-June. The measure of central bank balance sheet size is total assets 
on the central bank balance sheet. 
Source: Lenza (2010), Bank of Japan; Federal Reserve European Central Bank; Bank of England  
 
 
4  The Literature on the Effectiveness of QE 
 
Much of the literature on the effectiveness of particular policy tools, 
including QE, has been produced by central bank employees (Voutsinas and 
Werner, 2010), and it mostly focuses on the Japanese implementation of QE. 
Joyce, Lasaosa,, Stevens, and Tong (2010);  as well as Kobayashi and 
Spiegel (2006); Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010); and Shiratsuka (2010) and 
Ugai (2005, 2006) have been writing about QE and its assessment as staff 
members from either the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank or the Learning the lessons from QE 
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Federal Reserve. 
 
Voutsinas and Werner (2010) argue that the performance of central bank 
policy can be measured either in terms of processes (‘process-based 
performance’, which they chose to christen ‘input performance’) or relevant 
final economic outcomes (‘result performance’, ‘outcome performance’ or, 
their preferred term, ‘output performance’).  
 
“Output performance” assessment of QE 
 
Examples of empirical work on ‘output performance’ are Parking and Bade, 
(1980), Emerson et al. (1991), Cukierman et al. (1992), Alesina and 
Summers (1993), Hasan and Mester (2008), usually focusing on inflation 
performance. While this is in many ways the natural way to approach 
central bank performance measurement, it remains agnostic about the details 
of the monetary transmission mechanism and fails to engage in any debate 
concerning the suitability of particular monetary policy instruments, 
intermediary targets or approaches (i.e. by leaving ‘input performance’ up to 
the central bank). To a great extent, empirical analysis of the effects of 
monetary policy has treated the monetary transmission mechanism itself as 
a “black box” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Udai (2006) also stresses that 
“the transmission channels cannot be specified, [although] analyses find that 
the QEP had the effects of dispelling the funding concerns of financial 
institutions”. An “output-oriented” assessment of QE is made by Lasaosa, 
Stevens and Tong (2010): they study the impact of QE on financial markets, 
claiming that “the place where we might have expected to see the clearest 
direct impact of QE is in the reaction of financial markets. This in turn may 
provide the most timely and clearest read on the effectiveness of the policy 
and how it might be feeding through to the rest of the economy”. Their 
paper finally comes to the conclusion that “on balance, […] the largest part 
of the impact of QE came through a portfolio rebalancing channel”. 
 
 
“Input performance” assessment of QE 
 
The literature on the effectiveness of specific monetary policy instruments, Learning the lessons from QE 
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tools or intermediate targets under circumstances of extremely low interest 
rates is an example of empirical work on ‘input performance’. The literature 
analysing the effectiveness of monetary policy under conditions of 
extremely low interest (‘zero interest’ or ‘zero bound’) and/or the specific 
monetary policy instrument called ‘quantitative easing’ (QE), has defined 
the ‘effectiveness’ of such monetary policy not in terms of a final economic 
outcome, such as nominal GDP growth. Instead, the criterion for 
performance measurement is process-based ‘input performance’; namely, 
whether such policy had an impact on interest rates, another intermediate 
target. At the same time, the empirical research fails to present evidence that 
interest rates are a reliable proxy for any relevant output performance goal.  
 
Some theoretical work asks whether a shift to the quantity of money as an 
operational tool could substitute for lacking manoeuvrability of interest rates 
(Ueda, 2005, Oda and Ueda, 2007, Blinder, 2000, Orphanides and Wieland, 
1998). Most authors propose a theoretical general equilibrium model with 
rational expectations, including Krugman (1998), Fujiki, Okina and 
Shiratsuka (2001), Woodford (2003), Svensson (2003), Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). Bernanke, 
Reinhart and Sack (2004) also measure policy effectiveness by the success 
in lowering long-term interest rates (and find negative results in the case of 
Japan). 
  
This literature tends to share the assumptions of complete and efficient 
financial markets, whereby no agents face any constraints on their ability to 
borrow against future income. Instead of featuring a mechanistic monetary 
transmission mechanism, the models rely on the role of (unobservable) 
expectations and their impact on interest rates, which are assumed to be the 
main component of monetary transmission.  
 
The assumptions stated above broadly led researchers to define the 
‘effectiveness’ of QE as its effectiveness on interest rates (whether only 
short-term rates, as for instance in Krugman, 1998, or “the entire expected 
future path of short-term real rates, or very long term real rates” in 
Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). In such models, the only way to stimulate 
the economy is through a change in the general equilibrium level of interest. Learning the lessons from QE 
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In the words of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003): “‘quantitative easing’ that 
implies no change in interest-rate policy should neither stimulate real 
activity nor halt deflation; and this is equally true regardless of the kind of 
assets purchased by the central bank”. Udai (2005) reported that “the largest 
effect of QE found in form of its impact on expected future short-term 
interest rates”. Fujiki et al. (2001), employees of the BoJ, denied the 
effectiveness of QE in February 2001 because of the zero interest rate lower 
bound, although QE was reported to have been introduced by their employer 
one month later. Notably, they define QE as an expansion in bank reserves 
and/or increased open market purchases. BoJ staff, Kimura et al. (2002) and 
Shirakawa (2002) chose the same definition of QE, which is identical to the 
policy adopted by the BoJ in March 2001. Measuring the effectiveness of 
this policy by the impact it had on interest rates, they conclude that one year 
after introduction, QE was not effective. It fits the findings of Ueda (2005), 
who argued that with a near zero nominal interest rate, “there are serious 
limitations to what a central bank can do to increase the rate of inflation 
significantly”. Likewise, Kobayashi, Spiegel and Yamori (2006) find that 
“quantitative easing succeeded in reducing longer-term rates, and excess 
returns were larger among firms with weaker main banks”. In their 2007 
paper, Oda and Ueda (2007) share this optimistic view: they infer that the 
zero interest rate commitment has been effective in “lowering the 
expectations component of interest rates, especially with short- to medium-
term maturities”. 
 
Focus on input performance has another drawback: Fujiki et al. (2001) 
conjectured that QE was ineffective, as long-term yields remained low 
(‘indicating financial-market expectations that deflation will persist’). 
Blinder (2000), Kimura et al. (2002), Shirakawa (2002) and Ueda (2005) 
came to the same type of conclusion. This is of interest, since it indicates 
that the definition of ‘effectiveness’ of a policy tool, when framed in terms 
of input performance, may vary greatly, depending on the central bank’s 
interpretation: By contrast, Oda and Ueda (2007), Orphanides and Wieland 
(1998), Kobayashi, Spiegel and Yamori (2006) and the Bank of England 
staff members have argued that low bond yields are a reflection of 
successful QE, as the bond purchase operations are said to be the reason for 
lower long-term interest rates (see, for instance, Miles, 2009).  Learning the lessons from QE 
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We conclude that, surprisingly, the literature on quantitative easing and 
unorthodox monetary policy (including the literature on ‘zero interest rate 
policy’ or monetary policy at the ‘lower interest rate bound’) has largely 
confined itself to an analysis of the impact of such policies on another 
intermediate target, namely interest rates (including the term structure), 
while neglecting the influence on the variable that matters most to policy 
makers, businesses and households, especially in times of low inflation: 
nominal GDP  
 
Gaps in the literature and contribution of this paper 
 
Most of the literature on monetary policy and quantitative easing share some 
common weaknesses: 
 
a)  Assumptions: The literature often makes result-critical though 
unrealistic assumptions, such as assuming no friction or financial 
constraints. Many models do not feature banks, and if they do, they 
are not distinguished from non-bank financial intermediaries. There 
is considerable empirical evidence that banks are ‘special’ (e.g. 
Fama, 1985, Ashcraft, 2005), yet the literature on QE fails to 
incorporate banks in models that afford them special features not 
offered by non-bank financial intermediaries. The reliance on 
expectations as the sole transmission mechanism also raises a 
number of analytical problems.
5  It precludes the possibility of a 
direct, more mechanical transmission of monetary policy, as is 
frequently called for (e.g. Bernanke et al., 2004, Miles, 2009, Werner, 
                                                  
5 This strand of literature suffers from and at times concedes the time inconsistency problem identified by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), which renders monetary policy ineffective. Learning the lessons from QE 
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1997).
6  There is a gap in the literature on QE concerning less 
idealised and more realistic models of the economy that include 
financial friction and constraints, imperfect information and a 
plausible model of why banks are ‘special’. 
 
b)  The role of interest rates: The majority of the literature focuses on 
the impact of QE on interest rates, but does not feature empirical 
tests of the actual relationship of monetary policy instruments in 
general, and interest rates in particular, with final policy targets (such 
as nominal GDP). Were nominal interest rates not in the assumed 
negative and causal relationship with nominal GDP growth, the 
measurement of the effectiveness of QE by quantification of their 
impact on interest rates, as most analysts performed, would be 
invalid. 
 
c)  Assumed structural breaks: The literature often assumes but rarely 
tests for a structural break in the era of near-zero interest rates. The 
admission of a structural break suggests that the models employed 
are not sufficiently robust to allow for diverse circumstances. In the 
case of the Bank of England, the structural break is supposed to have 
taken place, when the Monetary Policy Committee cut Bank Rate to 
0.5%, namely on 5 March 2009. Should more robust models without 
structural break be found, they would be preferable. 
 
 
 
5  An Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of QE 
 
                                                  
6 Bernanke et al. (2004) have pointed out that the assumptions of frictionless financial markets and complete 
separation of monetary and fiscal policies which characterise this literature “to be sure, are rather strong. If these 
assumptions do not hold, we may have some basis for believing that quantitative easing will be effective. ” (p. 18). 
While remaining “agnostic about the precise mechanisms by which quantitative easing may have its effect” 
Bernanke et al. point to “the undeniable fact that, historically, money growth and inflation have tended to be 
strongly associated. It follows, according to this argument, that money creation will raise prices independent of its 
effects on the term structure” (p. 18). Learning the lessons from QE 
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By employing a different empirical methodology that does not require 
untested assumptions about the functioning of the economy or the operation 
of intermediary tools, the authors aim to address some of the gaps in the 
literature. The paper combines the measurement of output performance with 
input performance, by relating performance measurement to a final target 
variable. Adopting the same approach as Voutsinas and Werner (2010), the 
authors examine the performance of actual and potential monetary policy 
instruments and intermediary targets in explaining a final policy target 
variable, and conducting a ‘horse race’ test between them.  
 
The empirical data are from the Bank of England, which introduced and 
carried out ‘quantitative easing’ from March 2009 onwards. No ending date 
has been officially stated yet. Based on the results, meaningful conclusions 
can be made concerning the actual performance of central bank’s policies, as 
well as for other countries that have adopted similar policies.  
 
The authors propose to test the different tools at the disposal of the central 
bank and try to infer from this the “best practice” macroeconomic and 
monetary policies. None of the effects of conventional and un-conventional 
monetary policy is taken for granted, and all key tools and instruments of 
the BoE are under examination.  
 
5.1 Methodology 
 
We regress a generally accepted final target variable for monetary policy on 
a list of potential and actual central bank tools, instruments and intermediate 
targets (including different interpretations of what could be meant with 
‘quantitative easing’). Officially, the Bank of England aims not only at a 
particular inflation target, but also at a “… healthy and successful 
economy”
7, and considers its QE policy, as cited at the outset, a means to 
boost “nominal spending” and “the wider economy”. This is in line with the 
aims of governments, businesses and the general public: their main interest 
is nominal GDP growth, as wages, revenues and profits are in nominal 
terms. Thus a significant number of macroeconomists from various 
                                                  
7 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/financialsystem/index.htm Learning the lessons from QE 
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persuasions agree (unusually in this profession) that a nominal GDP growth 
target more readily reflects the objectives of governments and economic 
agents (Tobin, 1980, Bean, 1983, Meade, 1984, Gordon, 1985, Hall, 1985, 
Taylor, 1985, McCallum, 1997, 1999, Frankel, 1995).  
 
The literature on central bank performance has identified price stability, 
maximum economic growth, and stable currencies as the three key outputs 
of monetary policy.
8 Prices and output can be examined in one combined 
target variable, nominal GDP, without the need of separating the two.  
 
In order to establish empirically, based on historical relationships, which 
policy tools and instruments are more likely to be useful in influencing 
nominal GDP growth, the general-to-specific model selection methodology 
(the ‘London School of Economics methodology’, also known as the 
‘Hendry method’) is adopted. The general-to-specific methodology tends to 
produce robust and stable models (see e.g. Bauwens and Sucarrat, 2005).
9 It 
allows all competing monetary policy tools, intermediary instruments and 
differing interpretations of ‘quantitative easing’ to be equally represented in 
the first general model, whose features and statistical characteristics can also 
be tested (see Campos, Ericsson and Hendry, 2005).  
 
After the formulation of the general model, an objective sequential 
procedure of downward reduction to the parsimonious form is adopted, 
which amounts to a horse-race between the contenders. It also enables us to 
                                                  
8 Hasan and Mester (2008, p. 6) state: “…while the tasks assigned to particular central banks have changed over 
the years, their key focus remains macroeconomic stability, including stable prices (low inflation), stable exchange 
rates (in some countries), and fostering of maximum sustainable growth (which may or may not be explicitly listed 
as a goal of the central bank in enabling legislation). See, e.g., Tuladhar (2005), Siebert (2003), Lybek (2002), 
McNamara (2002), and Healey (2001), Amtenbrink (1999), Maier (2007), and Caprio and Vittas (1995).” Not 
everyone shares the focus on maximum growth. Cecchetti and Krause (2002) define central bank performance as a 
weighted average of output and inflation variability. 
8  “The GETS models are relatively c o n s i s t e n t  i n  t h a t  t h e y  t e n d  to be more accurate than the 
benchmark models on most horizons and according to both our forecast accuracy measures.” . 
Bauwens and Sucarrat, 2005. Learning the lessons from QE 
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assess the relative performance of the competing policy models.
10 This 
empirical benchmark can then be compared with particular actions taken by 
central banks in order to assess their likely relevance or effectiveness. The 
findings are likely to aid the design of effective monetary policy in general, 
and measure the effectiveness of ‘quantitative easing’ in particular. 
 
 
In theory, QE can be implemented by combining the two elements of the 
central bank balance sheet, namely size and composition (Bernanke and 
Reinhart, 2004). The size means extending the balance sheet, while keeping 
its composition unchanged (narrowly defined quantitative easing). The 
composition corresponds to changing the composition of the balance sheet, 
while keeping its size unchanged by replacing conventional assets with 
unconventional assets (narrowly defined credit easing). 
 
In a financial and economic crisis, both the asset and liability sides of the 
central bank balance sheet play an important role in countering the adverse 
effects stemming from the financial system. The asset side works as a 
substitute for private financial intermediation, for example, through the 
outright purchase of credit products. The liability side, especially expanded 
excess reserves, functions as a buffer for funding liquidity risk in the money 
markets.  
 
The following potential central bank policy instruments or intermediary 
targets have been cited in the literature: 
(a) Price tool: interest rates. The Bank Rate, the United Kingdom’s 
policy rate, will be the relevant variable. 
(b) Quantity tool I: traditionally, monetarist theory emphasised ‘high 
powered money’ (aka monetary base), which consists of two 
components: notes and coins in circulation and banks’ reserves held 
in their accounts with the central bank. The relevant variable is thus 
bank reserves. 
(c) Quantity tool II: it has been argued by the literature that the central 
                                                  
10 Theoretical discussions about the usefulness of a particular tool may turn out to be futile if this 
tool is not significant as an explanatory variable of the target variables. Learning the lessons from QE 
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bank’s balance sheet may be considered a tool of quantitative 
monetary policy (e.g. Bernanke et al., 2004). Specifically, the role of 
purchases of long-term assets, mainly government bonds, by the 
central bank is emphasised. This policy tool can most simply be 
quantified by considering the growth of central bank total assets, in 
addition to the: 
(d) ‘Quality tool’: the role of the composition of the central bank’s 
balance sheet. Willem Buiter has proposed a terminology to 
distinguish quantitative easing, or an expansion of a central bank's 
balance sheet, from what he terms qualitative easing. He says 
“qualitative easing is a shift in the composition of the assets of the 
central bank towards less liquid and riskier assets, holding constant 
the size of the balance sheet”. While a more complex analysis of the 
impact of various aspects of the composition of the central bank 
balance sheet on the target variables may be of interest in the future, 
here the basic ratio of long-term central bank assets to total assets 
is tested. These are defined to include both government bonds and 
direct loans to legal entities. 
(e) Intermediate target I: the money supply. Monetary aggregate M4 
will be taken into account, as it provides an accurate estimation for 
monetary holdings in the economy as a whole. 
(f)  Intermediate target II: bank credit. There is a substantial body of 
literature, including the so-called ‘credit view’ that considers bank 
lending important and ‘special’ (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995). A further innovation in this paper is the use of a more refined 
credit aggregate, namely bank credit to the real economy 
(excluding the sectors closely associated with non-GDP, financial 
transactions) which has been shown to be superior theoretically and 
empirically in accounting for nominal GDP (Werner, 1997, 2005). 
 
The personae dramatis of the econometric analysis can thus be summarised 
in Table 1, including their abbreviations in the econometric model. The 
sources and construction of the variables defined above can be found in 
annex 1. 
 
Table 1: Variables in the Empirical Model Learning the lessons from QE 
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Policy instrument or 
intermediary target 
 
Relevant variable in 
the UK 
Abbreviation in   
econometric model 
Interest rates  Bank Rate  Bankrate 
Bank reserves 
 
Reserves YoYRes 
Asset purchases 
 
BoE B/S  YoYBoETA 
‘Qualitative 
easing’/balance sheet 
composition 
Ratio of long-term 
assets of central bank 
B/S 
QualEasing 
Money supply 
 
M4 (holdings of the 
entire economy) 
M4 
Bank credit to the 
‘real economy’ (M4 
lending) 
M4 lending to all 
sectors except the 
financial one (non-
financial corporations, 
individuals, 
unincorporated 
businesses and non-
profit institutions 
serving households
11) 
M4LRE 
 
5.2. Empirical Findings 
 
The general model 
After stationarity tests have confirmed that all variables (except interest 
rates) are I(2) processes, year-on-year growth rates are calculated (except 
for interest rates) and the general model with nominal GDP as dependent 
variable is formulated. As discussed, the independent variables are the 
Bankrate (Bankrate), the bank reserves at the central bank (Res), the 
proportion of long-term assets on the central bank’s balance sheet 
(QualEasing), BoE total assets (BoETA), the traditional money supply 
measure M4 and the measure of broad credit used for GDP transactions 
(M4LRE). The general model is shown below in Table 2 (Eq 1). Tests of the 
error normality properties of the model found no problems.  
 
Table 2:  The General Model 
                                                  
11 See annex for further explanation. Learning the lessons from QE 
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EQ( 1)  Modelling YoYnGDP by OLS  
       The estimation sample is: 1995 (2) to 2010 (4) 
 
  Coefficient  Std  Error    t-value    t-prob  Part.R^2 
 
YoYnGDP_1        0.298944       0.1695       1.76     0.089     0.1000 
YoYnGDP_2        0.224352       0.2097       1.07     0.294     0.0393 
YoYnGDP_3        0.140846       0.2132      0.661     0.514     0.0153 
YoYnGDP_4        -0.352793       0.1693      -2.08     0.046     0.1342 
Constant  0.000882557      0.01616     0.0546     0.957     0.0001 
M4LRE  0.173137      0.09527       1.82     0.080   0.1055 
M4LRE_1           0.169488       0.1398       1.21     0.235     0.0499 
M4LRE_2           0.163549       0.1194       1.37     0.182     0.0628 
M4LRE_3           -0.146529       0.1580     -0.928     0.362     0.0298 
M4LRE_4           -0.144046       0.1716     -0.839     0.408     0.0245 
BankRate       0.00823152     0.006833       1.20     0.238     0.0493 
BankRate _1       -0.00532145      0.01021     -0.521     0.606     0.0096 
BankRate _2       0.000264448     0.009891     0.0267     0.979     0.0000 
BankRate _3       -0.00205284     0.009510     -0.216     0.831     0.0017 
BankRate _4       0.00374993     0.005484      0.684     0.500     0.0164 
YoYBoETA  -0.00157570     0.007663     -0.206     0.839     0.0015 
YoYBoETA_1      -0.00342880     0.008335     -0.411     0.684     0.0060 
YoYBoETA_2  -0.000928474     0.008945     -0.104     0.918     0.0004 
YoYBoETA_3      0.00891243     0.009727      0.916     0.367     0.0291 
YoYBoETA_4      -0.0259946     0.008612      -3.02     0.005     0.2455 
YoYRes          -2.08736e-005  3.403e-005    -0.613     0.545     0.0133 
YoYRes_1          -1.40251e-005  3.436e-005    -0.408     0.686     0.0059 
YoYRes_2           1.06650e-005  3.380e-005     0.316     0.755     0.0035 
YoYRes_3          -9.35783e-006  3.362e-005    -0.278     0.783     0.0028 
YoYRes_4          -2.42223e-005  3.272e-005    -0.740     0.465     0.0192 
QualEasing      0.00351896     0.008783      0.401     0.692     0.0057 
QualEasing_1     -0.00983846     0.009851     -0.999     0.326     0.0344 
QualEasing_2     -0.00108053     0.008151     -0.133     0.895     0.0006 
QualEasing_3     0.00288414     0.008277      0.348     0.730     0.0043 
QualEasing_4     -0.00890442     0.007149      -1.25     0.223     0.0525 
M4                 -0.0110177      0.08743     -0.126     0.901     0.0006 
M4_1                  0.0525224       0.1264      0.415     0.681     0.0061 
M4_2                  -0.180663       0.1332      -1.36     0.186     0.0617 
M4_3                   0.214646       0.1416       1.52     0.141     0.0759 
M4_4                  -0.105140       0.1076     -0.977     0.337     0.0330 
 
sigma      0.00901254       RSS    0.0022743234 
R^2                    0.940333      F(34,28) =      12.98 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood          232.827      DW                 2.33 
no.of observations      63    no. of parameters     35 
mean(YoYnGDP)       0.047609      var(YoYnGDP)       0.000605035 
 
AR 1-4 test:        F(4,24)  =     2.0656 [0.1170]   Learning the lessons from QE 
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ARCH 1-4 test:  F(4,20)  =    0.42292 [0.7902]   
Normality test:    Chi^2(2)  =     2.5366 [0.2813]   
Not enough observations for hetero test 
RESET test:        F(1,27)  =    0.20241 [0.6564]   
 
The parsimonious model 
Following the ‘gets’ methodology, this general model is reduced to its 
parsimonious form by sequentially dropping the most insignificant 
coefficient and then  re-estimating the new model after each single variable 
omission, until all coefficients are significant at the 5% level. Additionally, 
the downward reduction is checked for validity using F-tests and linear 
restriction tests (the progress report in PcGive). As a cut-off for the validity 
of the reduction progress, the 1% level was chosen. The result is the 
following parsimonious form (Table 3): 
 
Table 3:    The Parsimonious Model A 
 
EQ(2) Modelling YoYnGDP by OLS  
       The estimation sample is: 1995 (2) to 2010 (4) 
 
  Coefficient  Std  Error    t-value    t-prob  Part.R^2 
 
YoYnGDP_1        0.386947  0.08096       4.78     0.000     0.2934 
YoYnGDP_4        -0.352793       0.07887      -4.47     0.000     0.2665 
Constant  -0.0130521     0.004467      -2.92     0.005     0.1343 
M4LRE  0.180465      0.05314       3.40     0.001     0.1733 
M4LRE_1           0.214432      0.06737       3.18     0.002     0.1556 
Bankrate       0.00706230     0.001161       6.08     0.000     0.4021 
YoYBoETA_4      -0.0143186     0.002760      -5.19     0.000     0.3286 
QualEasing_1     -0.00903374     0.003037      -2.97     0.004     0.1386 
 
sigma      0.00811532     RSS    0.00362220987 
R^2                    0.904972      F(7,55) =       74.83 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood          218.167      DW                 2.02 
no.of observations      63    no. of parameters     8 
mean(YoYnGDP)       0.047609      var(YoYnGDP)       0.000605035 
 
AR 1-4 test:        F(4,51)  =    0.65049 [0.6292]   
ARCH 1-4 test:  F(4,47)  =    0.44625 [0.7745]   
Normality test:    Chi^2(2)  =     0.34775 [0.8404]   
hetero test:        F(14,40) =    0.63192 [0.8222]   
hetero-X test:      F(35,19) =    0.70570 [0.8185]   
RESET test:        F(1,54)  =     2.1717 [0.1464]   
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Solved static long run equation for YoYnGDP 
  Coefficient  Std  Error    t-value    t-prob 
Constant  -0.0135164     0.004930      -2.74     0.008 
M4LRE  0.408945      0.06910       5.92     0.000 
CallRate       0.00731355    0.0006461      11.3     0.000 
YoYBoETA          -0.0148280     0.002612      -5.68     0.000    
QualEasing       -0.00935512     0.003057      -3.06     0.003 
Long-run sigma = 0.00840402 
 
ECM = YoYnGDP + 0.0135164 - 0.408945*M4LRE - 0.00731355*CallRate + 
0.014828*YoYBoETA + 0.00935512*QualEasing; 
 
WALD test: Chi^2(4) = 304.295 [0.0000] ** 
 
 
Analysis of lag structure, coefficients: 
  Lag 0      Lag 1      Lag 2     Lag 3     Lag 4        Sum  SE(Sum) 
YoYnGDP       -1      0.387         0    0     -0.353  -0.966      0.111 
Constant  -0.0131       0  0  0  0  -0.0131    0.00447 
M4LRE  0.18      0.214         0   0  0  0.395     0.0575 
CallRate  0.00706      0  0  0  0  0.00706    0.00116 
YoYBoETA  0  0  0  0  -0.0143    -0.0143    0.00276 
QualEasing  0  -0.00903     0  0  0  -0.00903    0.00304 
 
Tests on the significance of each variable 
Variable  F-test          Value [  Prob]       Unit-root t-test 
YoYnGDP  F(2,55)  =     20.535 [0.0000]**        -8.7328** 
Constant  F(1,55)  =     8.5358 [0.0050]**   
M4LRE  F(2,55)  =     24.972 [0.0000]**        6.8683 
CallRate  F(1,55)  =     36.984 [0.0000]**        6.0815 
YoYBoETA  F(1,55)  =     26.919 [0.0000]**        -5.1884 
QualEasing  F(1,55)  =     8.8468 [0.0044]**        -2.9744 
 
Tests on the significance of each lag 
Lag 1        F(3,55)  =   32.002 [0.0000]** 
Lag 4        F(2,55)  =   18.738 [0.0000]** 
 
Tests on the significance of all lags up to 4 
Lag 1 - 4    F(5,55)  =   29.945 [0.0000]** 
Lag 2 - 4    F(2,55)  =   18.738 [0.0000]** 
Lag 3 - 4    F(2,55)  =   18.738 [0.0000]** 
Lag 4 - 4    F(2,55)  =   18.738 [0.0000]** 
 
As can be seen, parsimonious model A has no noticeable problems and Learning the lessons from QE 
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appears to be a valid empirical model of nominal GDP growth. No 
significant variables were dropped at this point. Three issues arise: 
a)  Bankrate has a positive sign. 
b)  Bank of England total assets have a negative sign. This may be due 
to data issues. The authors learned from conversations with the BoE 
staff that the time series for the assets of the BoE prior to 2006, 
comprising “advances and other accounts” (AEFK) relates to the 
BoE’s participation in the TARGET system which began with the 
introduction of the Euro in January 1999
12. Therefore the apparent 
role of BoE total assets may be overstated.  
c)  The coefficient of qualitative easing is found to be negatively 
correlated with nominal GDP.  
 
The charts of the actual and fitted curves for nominal GDP growth are 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Actual and fitted nominal GDP (model A), Error terms  
                                                  
12 footnote on the series in question (AEFK): “The large increases in Reserves and other accounts, 
and Advances and other accounts from January 1999 arise from the Bank of England's role in 
TARGET, as a result of which other European central banks may hold substantial credit balances 
or overdrafts with the Bank.” Also, the subsequent fall in December 2000 is almost certainly 
related to the below extract from the Bank’s 2001 annual report: “The size of Banking 
Department’s balance sheet has, for the past two years, been largely determined by the bilateral 
positions between central banks in the TARGET system. As explained in previous years these 
balances reflected the net flows between the individual countries through the central banks and 
fluctuated with such payments. Although the net position was what mattered for most operational 
purposes, the individual balances were with different legal entities and had therefore to be shown 
gross under UK accounting rules. A netting arrangement was implemented from 30 November 
2000, under which the bilateral balances that arise intra-day between the central banks are netted 
into a single position with the European Central Bank.”  
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Given these empirical issues with Bank of England assets and maturity 
composition of the balance sheet (qualitative easing), parsimonious model A 
was further reduced, by dropping QualEasing, as well as the first lag of M4 
lending to the real economy (M4LRE) from the equation. This leads to 
parsimonious model B (see table 4). 
 
Table 4:    Parsimonious Model B 
 
EQ( 3)    Modelling YoYnGDP by OLS  
The estimation sample is: 1995 (2) to 2010 (4) 
 
  Coefficient  Std  Error    t-value    t-prob  Part.R^2 
 
YoYnGDP_1        0.565444      0.07106       7.96     0.000     0.5263 
YoYnGDP_4        -0.362486      0.08513      -4.26     0.000     0.2413 
Constant  -0.00693162     0.004596      -1.51     0.137     0.0384 
M4LRE  0.271940      0.04902       5.55     0.000     0.3506 
BankRate       0.00588350     0.001257       4.68     0.000     0.2778 
YoYBoETA_4      -0.00998374     0.002834      -3.52     0.001     0.1788 
 
sigma      0.00909157     RSS    0.00471143312 
R^2                    0.876396      F(5,57) =       80.83 [0.000]** Learning the lessons from QE 
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log-likelihood          209.885      DW                 2.37 
no.of observations      63    no. of parameters     6 
mean(YoYnGDP)       0.047609      var(YoYnGDP)       0.000605035 
 
AR 1-4 test:        F(4,53)  =    1.4870 [0.2193]   
ARCH 1-4 test:  F(4,49)  =    0.73266 [0.5741]   
Normality test:    Chi^2(2)  =     1.2823 [0.5267]   
hetero test:        F(10,46) =    0.99101 [0.4648]   
hetero-X test:      F(20,36) =    0.93742 [0.5494]   
RESET test:        F(1,56)  =     2.0787 [0.1549]   
 
Solved static long run equation for YoYnGDP 
  Coefficient  Std  Error    t-value    t-prob 
Constant  -0.00869668     0.006139      -1.42     0.162 
M4LRE  0.341186      0.08070       4.23     0.000 
CallRate       0.00738167    0.0008602      8.58     0.000 
YoYBoETA          -0.0125260     0.003385      -3.70     0.000    
QualEasing       -0.00935512     0.003057      -3.06     0.003 
Long-run sigma =  0.0114066 
 
ECM = YoYnGDP + 0.00869668 - 0.341186*M4LRE - 0.00738167*CallRate + 
0.012526*YoYBoETA; 
 
WALD test: Chi^2(3) = 158.023 [0.0000] ** 
 
 
Analysis of lag structure, coefficients: 
  Lag 0      Lag 1      Lag 2     Lag 3     Lag 4        Sum  SE(Sum) 
YoYnGDP       -1      0.565         0    0     -0.362     -0.797      0.115 
Constant  -0.00693     0  0  0  0  0.272      0.049 
M4LRE  0.18      0.214         0   0  0  0.395     0.0575 
BankRate  0.00588      0  0  0  0  0.00588    0.00126 
YoYBoETA  0 0 0  0  -0.00998  -0.00998      0.00283 
 
Tests on the significance of each variable 
Variable  F-test          Value [  Prob]       Unit-root t-test 
YoYnGDP  F(2,57)  =     43.404 [0.0000]**        -6.9447** 
Constant  F(1,57)  =     2.2741 [0.1371]     
M4LRE  F(1,57)  =     30.776 [0.0000]**        5.5476 
CallRate  F(1,57)  =     21.925 [0.0000]**        4.6824 
YoYBoETA  F(1,57)  =     12.407 [0.0008]**        3.5224 
 
Tests on the significance of each lag 
Lag 1        F(1,57)  =   63.317 [0.0000]** 
Lag 4        F(2,57)  =   12.075 [0.0000]** 
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Tests on the significance of all lags up to 4 
Lag 1 - 4    F(3,57)  =   35.373 [0.0000]** 
Lag 2 - 4    F(2,57)  =   12.075 [0.0000]** 
Lag 3 - 4    F(2,57)  =   12.075 [0.0000]** 
Lag 4 - 4    F(2,57)  =   12.075 [0.0000]** 
 
Parsimonious model B has no noticeable problems either. The charts of the 
actual and fitted curves for nominal GDP growth are shown in Figure 2. 
This model seems valid as an empirical model of nominal GDP growth, 
although some stars come up in the tests of model reduction (PCGive’s 
“progress test”). These stars are the result of the omission of significant 
variables in this model (QualEasing_1 and M4LRE_1).  
 
 
Figure 2 – Acutal and fitted nominal GDP (model B), Error terms 
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Granger-causality tests show that there is evidence for unidirectional 
‘causality’ from lending variable M4LRE to nominal GDP, and not in the 
other direction (Table 5). 
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Table 5:  Granger ‘causality’ test: Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
Model 
 
Test on the 
significance of 
independent 
variable 
nGDP dependent 
M4LRE independent 
nGDP independent 
M4LRE dependent 
Dynamic 
Analysis:  F(4,54) = 7.7773 [0.0001]**  F(4,54)  =   2.3729 [0.0636] 
 
Finally, structural break tests are conducted, to examine whether there were 
any breaks in the relationship between nominal GDP and monetary 
variables.  
 
First, the recursive graphical tests are shown in Figure 2. We tested for 
structural breaks in March 2009 – the official date of implementation of QE 
- but also in quarter 2 of 2006, when the series for BoE assets began to be 
calculated differently (new methods were applied due to reforms to the 
Bank of England’s money market operations on 18 May 2006
13 and the data 
collection changed). 
 
As can be seen, there is no indication that a structural break occurred either 
in March 2009, when ‘quantitative easing’ was said to have been adopted, 
or in 2006, when the new money market reforms were introduced. 
 
 
                                                  
13 See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/ms/articles/artjun06.pdf Learning the lessons from QE 
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Figure 2:  Recursive Structural Break Tests 
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A more precise test of whether the relationship between nominal GDP and 
its explanatory variables changed in the period of 2009 Q1 - when the BoE 
is said to have implemented QE – or in 2006 Q2 – when new money market 
reforms and data collection methods were first implemented by the BoE - 
can be conducted by the inclusion of a dummy variable. We introduced the 
dummies in the general model and in the two parsimonious forms. In the 
downward reduction process, the dummy for QE drops out at an early stage.  
The dummies are found to be insignificant (tables 6 and 7). Models A and B 
with dummies did not show any problem. The F-tests for exclusion of the 
dummies indicated that they can be dropped. The final forms, identical with 
the above, did not have any statistical problems (see Tables 3 and 4 for the 
former case). 
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Table 6:  Dummy Variable for QE and 2006 in parsimonious model A 
 
EQ( 4) Modelling YoYnGDP by OLS        
 The estimation sample is: 1995 (2) to 2010 (4) 
 
  Coefficient  Std  Error    t-value    t-prob  Part.R^2 
 
YoYnGDP_1        0.366317      0.07738       4.73     0.000     0.2972 
YoYnGDP_4        -0.412926       0.1054      -3.92     0.000     0.2247 
Constant  -0.00225855      0.01199     -0.188     0.851     0.0007 
M4LRE  0.144192      0.05284       2.73     0.009     0.1232 
M4LRE_1           0.216470      0.07707       2.81     0.007     0.1296 
BankRate       0.00661335     0.001257       5.26     0.000     0.3431 
YoYBoETA_4      -0.0136886     0.002982      -4.59     0.000     0.2845 
QualEasing_1     -0.0114332     0.003011      -3.80     0.000     0.2139 
Dummy2006      -0.00783052     0.002803      -2.79     0.007     0.1283 
DummyQE       -0.00207126     0.009874     -0.210     0.835     0.0008 
 
sigma      0.00770752    RSS    0.00314851483 
R^2                    0.917399      F(9,53) =       65.4 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood          222.582      DW                 2.14 
no.of observations      63    no. of parameters     10 
mean(YoYnGDP)       0.047609      var(YoYnGDP)       0.000605035 
 
AR 1-4 test:        F(4,49)  =    0.18071 [0.9473]   
ARCH 1-4 test:  F(4,45)  =    0.54453 [0.7039]   
Normality test:    Chi^2(2)  =     0.57279 [0.7510]   
hetero test:        F(16,36) =    0.63637 [0.8327]   
 Not enough observations for hetero-X test 
RESET test:        F(1,52)  =     2.0217 [0.1610]   
 
 
Table 7:  Dummy Variable for QE and 2006 in parsimonious model B 
 
EQ(5) Modelling YoYnGDP by OLS  
       The estimation sample is: 1995 (2) to 2010 (4) 
 
  Coefficient  Std  Error    t-value    t-prob  Part.R^2 
 
YoYnGDP_1        0.518409      0.07389       7.02     0.000     0.4723 
YoYnGDP_4        -0.482462       0.1028      -4.69     0.000     0.2858 
Constant  0.0139026      0.01090       1.28     0.208     0.0287 
M4LRE  0.207169      0.05659       3.66     0.001     0.1959 
BankRate       0.00476614     0.001330       3.58     0.001     0.1892 
YoYBoETA_4      -0.00762119     0.002974      -2.56     0.013     0.1067 
Dummy2006     -0.00447062     0.003081      -1.45     0.152     0.0369 Learning the lessons from QE 
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DummyQE       -0.0156552     0.009415      -1.66     0.102     0.0479 
 
sigma      0.00885368     RSS    0.00431132206 
R^2                    0.886893      F(7,55) =       61.61 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood          212.681      DW                 2.18 
no.of observations      63    no. of parameters     8 
mean(YoYnGDP)       0.047609      var(YoYnGDP)       0.000605035 
     
AR 1-4 test:        F(4,51)  =    0.59422 [0.6684]   
ARCH 1-4 test:  F(4,47)  =    1.1006 [0.3674]   
Normality test:    Chi^2(2)  =     0.57279 [0.7510]   
hetero test:        F(12,42) =    0.95912 [0.5010]   
hetero-X test:      F(32,22) =     1.0740 [0.4381]   
RESET test:        F(1,54)  =     1.1215 [0.2943] 
 
Based on the various tests above, we conclude that no statistical evidence of 
a significant change in the relationship between potential monetary policy 
tools or intermediary targets and nominal GDP could be found when 
quantitative easing was officially implemented in March 2009. The 
announcement of changes in the operating procedure by the BoE seems not 
to have disturbed the explanatory variables of nominal GDP. 
  
Unlike parsimonious model B, parsimonious model A finds a structural 
break in 2006(Q2). One could therefore argue that  the strategy of the BoE 
has changed at the point at which the money market reforms of May 2006 
were introduced, although no difference is found in May 2006, either in 
parsimonious model B (table 7) or in the recursive structural break tests 
(figure 2). 
 
The results suggest that the research strategy of measuring the effectiveness 
of QE by the perceived impact on nominal interest rates or the term 
structure – as has been dominant in the literature – may not be fruitful. The 
findings also differ from much of the literature in that there appears to be a 
stable relationship between nominal GDP growth and a broad money 
lending aggregate, confirming earlier findings (Werner, 1997, Voutsinas and 
Werner, 2010).  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In summary, the authors have come to several findings: Learning the lessons from QE 
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(a) The quantity equation relationship: M4 lending growth, adjusted to 
include only credit for transactions that contribute to GDP, is found 
to be in a stable long-term relationship with nominal GDP growth 
(see annex 1). With this, the long-standing velocity decline problem 
is overcome (the lack of such disaggregation had previously been 
identified as the reason for the apparent ‘velocity decline’, Werner, 
1997, 2005).  
(b) The ‘new consensus’ of monetary policy implementation had been to 
focus mainly on nominal short-term interest rates for central banks 
(see e.g. Woodford, 2003, Curdia and Woodford, 2010, Lenza et al, 
2010), at least until the 2008 crisis. However, interest rates are found 
to be positively correlated with GDP in our model. Mainstream 
monetary theories are not validated by our analysis. This raises the 
prospect of a revival of a more traditional, quantity-based approach 
(monetarism modified by the use of disaggregated credit 
counterparts). 
(c) The BoE’s announcement of March 2009 claimed that a break with 
past policy was made and a massive amount of assets was newly 
purchased. However, there is no evidence that monetary policy 
changed in a meaningful way at that specific point in time. Total 
assets do not appear to be in a positive relationship with the 
economy throughout the 1995 to 2010 observation period. 
(d) ‘Unorthodox monetary policy tools’: There seems no need to make 
recourse to ‘unorthodox’ monetary policy, or at least name them in a 
new way: bank reserves must historically be considered an orthodox 
method (Bernanke et al., 2004). Targeting them together with a 
broad monetary aggregate (also an orthodox idea, albeit refined here 
by the use of a disaggregated credit counterpart) appears to be a 
promising avenue for research and policy applications. 
(e) The ‘qualitative easing’ strategy of changing a central bank’s 
balance sheet composition (by increasing long-term holdings of 
assets) does not seem to have a significant impact on the economy, 
as this particular indicator dropped out from the model. 
(f)  Total central bank asset growth was not found to be helpful as far as 
the recovery of the economy is concerned. It is not found to play a Learning the lessons from QE 
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positive role on GDP, and probably no role at all (if any, it is 
actually a negative one). It is thus unlikely to be attractive as a main 
monetary policy instrument. 
(g) As credit for GDP transactions if found to have so much importance 
in affecting economic growth, all methods that may influence this 
particular variable need to be considered. Suggestions are made in 
Werner (1995, 2005), and include the substitution of bond issuance 
with government borrowing from banks. This would boost credit 
creation which, ironically, was the original meaning of the term 
‘quantitative easing’. Another, more controversial method would be 
the re-introduction of a regime of credit controls (‘window 
guidance’).  
(h) Finally, the most recent collapse in credit for the real economy 
suggests that policies need to be adopted to expand it. 
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-  Annex 1 – 
Data Sources and Issues 
 
No complete time series of the reserves of banks with the Bank of England 
or for Bank of England’s total assets are provided on the central bank’s 
website. Several time series suffer from a break or discountinuity, even 
termination, in June 2006. BoE staff members stated that this discontinuity 
is due to the introduction of new calculation methods as a result of the 
implementation on 18 May 2006 of new money market reforms
14. Data after 
2006 only are complete (see further explanations below). 
 
Note: Data that was not quarterly originally: it was transformed by the 
authors (by keeping only the amounts outstanding at the end of every 
quarter, from 1995 to 2010). 
 
-  Nominal GDP (GDP): Data bases of most institutions (Bank of 
England, European Central Bank, IMF, World Bank, OECD etc.) 
fail to provide simple time series of GDP in its nominal format, 
which is neither seasonally adjusted nor real (inflation adjusted). The 
time series of GDP these institutions provide do not allow for strong 
conclusions. Indeed, calculations made to adjust various 
perturbations are rather opaque, which renders it quite confusing and 
makes it difficult to draw economic and policy conclusions. 
Therefore the authors picked a series of nominal GDP data provided 
by the Office for National Statistics and available from its Economic 
and Labour Market Review monthly issue. 
 
-  Bank Rate (Bankrate) : The quarterly average of the official Bank 
Rate was provided by the Bank of England (time series 
IUQABEDR) 
 
-  Bank of Engand Reserves (BoEReserves): Because of the money 
market reforms introduced in June 2006, time series of the Bank of 
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England balance sheet are discontinued in June 2006
15. Therefore the 
authors had to combine different data to build a continued series (the 
BoE’s balance sheet being quite different from prior 2006 to post 
2006). Before June 2006, the authors used the initial definition of 
M0 to calculate out the BoE reserves: As M0 equals reserves plus 
notes and coins in circulation outside the bank of England, the 
authors calculated the time series for reserves as the difference 
between M0 prior 2006 (time series LPMAVAD) and Notes and 
Coins outside the BoE (time series LPMAVAA). After June 2006, 
the data on BoE reserves of the new balance sheet was kept 
unchanged (Table B1.1.1, time series BL38). The obtained time 
series for BoE reserves from 1985 to 2010 is not available online but 
it can be provided by the authors on demand. 
 
  prior June 2006  post June 2006 
Author's time series for BoE reserves (Res) 
LPMAVAD  ‐ LPMAVAA (= M0 ‐ Notes 
and Coins outside the BoE) 
BL38 (= BoE Reserves) 
 
-  Bank of England Total Assets (BoETotAssets): Just like in the 
above case of the BoE reserves, and because of the money market 
reforms implemented in June 2006, no continued data of the BoE 
total assets is available in the BoE database. Therefore the authors 
had to build up their own data once again. Prior June 2006, the 
authors calculated the BoE total assets by adding up the values of all 
the assets owned by the central bank, namely: Banking Department’s 
securities - including Treasury bills - issued by Central Government 
(RPQAEFJ); Banking Department’s advances and other accounts 
(RPQAEFK); Banking Department’s premises equipment and other 
securities (RPQAEFL); Banking Department’s holdings of notes and 
coin (RPQAEFM); Issue Department’s securities issued by Central 
                                                  
15  See  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/ms/articles/artjun06.pdf: Reserve balances 
replaced operational deposits in 2006 and these are much larger then operational deposits, as 
banks and building societies were able to hold voluntary interest-bearing reserves with the BoE 
from 2006 onwards. Unfortunately therefore the BoE does not have reserve balance data prior to 
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Government (RPQAEFC) and Issue Department’s other securities 
(RPQAEFD). Post 2006, the authors kept unchanged the time series 
of total assets of the Issue Department (BL37) plus total assets of the 
Banking Department (BL56) that can be found on the BoE balance 
sheet (table B1.1.1) 
 
  prior June 2006  post June 2006 
Author's time series for BoE total assets 
(BoETA) 
RPQAEFJ + RPQAEFK + RPQAEFL + 
RPQAEFM + RPQAEFC + RPQAEFD   
(= securities 1 + advances and other 
+ premises equipment and other + 
notes and coins + securities 2 + other 
securities) 
BL37 + BL56 (= total assets 
of the Issue Department + 
total assets of the Banking 
Department) 
 
-  Qualitative easing (QualEasing): According to Buiter, the 
composition of the central bank’s balance sheet may be a relevant 
instrument for monetary policy. We have chosen to focus on the 
ratio of long-term central bank assets to total assets. Once again, an 
adjustment was needed in the data, and a time series for qualitative 
easing had to be constructed by the authors. Before June 2006, we 
took the ratio of the long term assets of the Issue and Banking 
Departments (which is the sum of the value of the Issue 
department’s long term assets, RPQAEFC, plus the banking 
Department’s long term assets, RPQAEFJ) over total assets 
(obtained with the method explained above). After June 2006, this 
ratio was calculated by dividing the value of the long term assets of 
the Issue and Banking Departments that can be found on the BoE 
balance sheet. It is the sum of the value of the Issue department’s 
long term assets, BL35, plus the banking Department’s long term 
assets, BL53, over BoE’s total assets (see above). In this manner, the 
authors obtain a continued time series of qualitative easing from 
1988 to 2010, representing the ratio of the BoE long term assets over 
its total assets. This series will be made available on demand. 
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  prior June 2006  post June 2006 
Author's time series for Qualitative Easing 
(QualEasing) 
(RPQAEFC + RPQAEFJ) / BoETA (= 
(Issue Dpt's long term assets + 
Banking Dpt's long term assets) / 
total assets of the BoE) 
(BL35 + BL53) / BoETA (= 
Issue Dpt's long term assets 
+ Banking Dpt's long term 
assets) / total assets of the 
BoE) 
 
-  Monetary aggregate M4:  As admitted by BoE staff members 
during conversations with the authors, B6NM is not an accurate time 
series for M4 excluding other financial corporations, although it is 
its name. The BoE members were not able to explain why, as “prior 
to 1996 data were collected differently and unfortunately we (the 
BoE,  author’s note) are unable to breakdown clearly its 
contributions”.  
In order to introduce the M4 monetary aggregate into the regression, 
the authors had to build their own time series of M4 from the BoE 
database. As explained above, the authors had to build their own M4 
aggregate for the real economy instead of using the time series called 
“M4 excluding other financial corporations” (B6NM) provided by 
the Bank of England. In order to add to the time series of “M4 
holdings of other financial corporations” (LPQAVHA) and get a 
general M4 aggregate for the whole economy, the authors built a 
time series different from B6NM in order to account for M4 
holdings of the real economy. This latter is a sum of M4 holdings of 
private non-financial corporations (LPQAVHB) and M4 holdings of 
the household sector (LPQVSCL).  
The time series for M4 was in the end a sum of M4 holdings of other 
financial corporations (LPQAVHA), of private non-financial 
corporations (LPQAVHB) and of the household sector (LPQVSCL). 
It is made available by the authors on demand.  
 
  prior June 2006  post June 2006 
Author's time series for monetary 
aggregate M4 (M4)  
LPQAVHA + LPQAVHB + LPQVSCL (= M4 holdings of other financial 
corporations + private non‐financial corporations + household 
sector) 
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Note: From 1982 to 1989, our own addition of individual sectors is 
substantially larger than the total provided by the Bank of England 
(by more than £100bn). The Bank of England could not provide a 
satisfactory explanation
16.  
 
-  M4 lending aggregate to the real economy (M4LRE): The authors 
have been looking for an accurate lending aggregate that would 
theoretically and empirically account for nominal GDP (Werner, 
1997, 2005). M4 lending to the real economy is a sum of M4 lending 
to all sectors excluding the financial one. Instead of using the time 
series called “M4 lending excluding other financial corporations” 
(B6NL) provided by the Bank of England, the authors had to build 
their own M4 lending aggregate for the real economy. Indeed, from 
personal conversations with the BoE staff again, it seems that the 
central bank cannot explain why B6NL is not a reliable time series, 
although it admits it is not. We had the exact same problem as with 
B6NM (see above for the M4 monetary aggregate). Whereas B6NL 
should have been a good proxy for bank credit to the real economy; 
we had to build our own lending to the real economy time series 
(M4LRE). We added up lending to private non-financial 
corporations (LPQAVHF); lending to the household sector (secured 
lending to individuals, LPQAVHG, and unsecured lending to 
individuals, LPQVVXS) and lending to unincorporated businesses 
and non-profit making institutions (LPQAVHI). This data is made 
available on demand. 
                                                  
16 An abstract from an email sent by a BoE employee: «  Prior to 1996 data were collected 
differently and unfortunately we are unable to break down clearly it’s contributions therefore I 
can’t give you an exact reason as to why the data don’t add up in the back data.  The quality of data 
improved in 1990 (the summing becomes much more accurate) and then again in 1996 when we 
started collecting the data under the current methodology. The reason the monthly data sum up 
exactly is because they only begin in 1996 when our improved methodology began.” It is clear that 
no light is shed on the reason why B6NM is not an accurate data of “M4 excluding other financial 
corporations” although it is presented as such on the BoE website, and no improvement of the data 
is scheduled in the near future. Learning the lessons from QE 
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  prior June 2006  post June 2006 
Author's time series for M4 lending to the 
real economy (M4LRE) 
LPQAVHF + LPQAVHG + LPQVVXS + LPQAVHI                       
(= lending to private non‐financial corporations + lending to the 
household sector (secured + unsecured lending to individuals) + 
lending to unincorporated businesses and non‐profit making 
institutions) 
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